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PREVIEW; State of Montana v. Laird: Prosecutorial Delay, 




Oral arguments are scheduled for Wednesday, May 1, 2019, 
at 10:00 a.m. in Ballroom A of the Strand Union Building on the 
Montana State University Campus in Bozeman, Montana. An 




This case presents three issues for review: 1) what 
constitutes actual prejudice for an unconstitutional prosecutorial 
delay; 2) whether the State may use circumstantial evidence to prove 
cause of death in a homicide case when that cause is in question; and 
3) whether testimony from an unavailable witness is hearsay when 
it is introduced to describe the steps taken during an autopsy.  
 
In 2016, Defendant Brian Laird (Laird) was convicted of 
murdering his wife, Kathryn, who died in 1999.1 On appeal, Laird 
argues his case must be dismissed because the 15-year prosecutorial 
delay violated his due process rights and because the State failed to 
present sufficient evidence that he murdered Kathryn.2 
Alternatively, Laird argues that the district court improperly 
admitted hearsay testimony and an unduly prejudicial photograph 
from Kathryn’s autopsy.3 The State responds that Laird was not 
unduly prejudiced by the delay.4 Further, the State argues it 
presented sufficient evidence to show that Laird, not an accident, 
killed Kathryn.5 Finally, the State argues that the district court 
properly admitted the testimony and the photograph.6 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Kathryn’s body was found in the “Afterbay” area on July 31, 
                                                     
*Calder Thingvold, a 2019 juris doctor candidate at the Alexander 
Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, interned in the 
Appellate Division of the Montana State Public Defender’s Office during 2019 
but was not involved with the State v. Laird appeal in any capacity. 
1 Appellee’s Response Brief at 1, 12, State v. Laird, 
https://perma.cc/9U38-YJVX (Mont. Nov. 1, 2016) (No. DA 16-0473). 
2 Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief at 16–18, State v. Laird, 
https://perma.cc/Y8GT-DAPY (Mont. Oct. 16, 2018) (No. DA 16-0473). 
3 Id. at 36, 39. 
4 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 24. 
5 Id. at 24–25. 
6 Id. at 25.  
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1999.7 Witness reported seeing Laird arguing with Kathryn in the 
preceding days, sometimes turning violent.8 The night before 
Kathryn died, the pair argued at her workplace and Laird’s 
neighbors, Kathleen and Erik, heard raised voices at the Laird’s 
home that evening.9 Later, Kathleen saw a male figure drive away 
from the Laird residence and later still heard their daughter’s dog, 
who had a history of aggression towards males, barking in the 
direction of the Afterbay walking path.10 
 
The next morning, Laird visited Kathryn’s friend Tanya and 
told her Kathryn was missing.11 Laird said he had argued with 
Kathryn when she arrived home the previous night, and he had then 
driven to the Afterbay parking lot.12 Kathryn found him there and 
they eventually returned home, where Laid reported she seemed 
agitated and suicidal.13 Tanya and Laird unsuccessfully searched for 
Kathryn before Laird called 911 to report her disappearance, and 
Tanya then found Kathryn’s body floating in the Afterbay.14 
 
The county coroner responded to the scene, then arterially 
embalmed the body before an autopsy, which is a process known to 
make bruises appear darker than usual.15 Dr. Mueller autopsied 
Kathryn’s body, then brought in Dr. Bennett for a second autopsy.16 
FBI Agent Jackson secured a warrant, searched Laird’s trailer, and 
found potential evidence that Laird accounted for.17 Agent Jackson 
also received a tip that Kathleen heard an argument the night before 
Kathryn died, but he did not recall following up with her.18  
 
Laird was not charged until 2014 after the re-discovery of a 
note containing Kathleen’s contact information and other possible 
evidence.19 The district court denied Laird’s pretrial motion to 
dismiss for unfairly prejudicial delay and loss of evidence, finding 
Laird’s argument that lost evidence would have helped his case 
speculative and that he had failed to demonstrate undue prejudice.20 
The district court also denied Laird’s motion to dismiss at the close 
                                                     
7 Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 3.  
8 Id. at 4.  
9 Id. at 4–5.  
10 Id.  
11 Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 6. 
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
14 Id. at 7. 
15 Id. at 8. 
16 Id. at 10. 
17 Id. at 7–8. 
18 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 15. 
19 Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 15. 
20 Id. at 21. 
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of the State’s case-in-chief due to lack of sufficient evidence.21 At 
trial, Laird objected to the State’s evidence, offered through Agent 
Jackson, regarding Dr. Mueller’s comments during the autopsy and 
a photograph showing Kathryn’s exposed skull.22 The district court 
admitted the statement for the limited purpose of describing a shift 
in the tone of the autopsy and admitted the photograph.23  
 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
A. Prosecutorial Delay 
 
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution 
protects an individual from oppressive prosecutorial delays, 
requiring that charges be dismissed when a trial would violate 
fundamental judicial fairness.24 Oppressive delays are evaluated 
under a two-step test that first asks whether the delay actually, 
substantially prejudiced the defendant.25 If so, the court then 
examines the State’s reasons for the delay and weighs those reasons 
against the defendant’s prejudice, weighing intentional or reckless 
delay more heavily against the State than delay resulting from 
negligence.26 
 
1. Appellant/Defendant Brian Laird 
 
Laird argues that the district court erred in dismissing his 
pretrial motion for prosecutorial delay because he demonstrated 
actual prejudice.27 Laird relies on State v. Passmore28 and State v. 
Taylor29 to support his argument that prejudice in the context of 
delay contemplates more than just “helpful” evidence, and instead it 
also includes the “impairment” of a defendant’s ability to present 
their defense.30 
 
First, Laird argues the deaths of potential witnesses Russell 
Renner and Dr. Mueller impaired his ability to defend himself 
effectively, as did the loss of body tissue evidence.31 Dr. Mueller’s 
report following Kathryn’s initial autopsy sparked suspicions about 
                                                     
21 Id. at 2. 
22 Id. at 37–38. 
23 Id. at 39.  
24 United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977). 
25 Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 20. 
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 21. 
28 225 P.3d 1229 (Mont. 2010). 
29 960 P.2d 773 (Mont. 1998). 
30 Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 21. 
31 Id.  
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Laird’s involvement in the death.32 According to Laird, the State 
used statements about Dr. Mueller’s suspicions concerning 
Kathryn’s bruising to establish her manner of death and convince 
the jury of Laird’s involvement.33 Laird alleges that his inability to 
confront Dr. Mueller due to prosecutorial delay prejudiced him 
substantially.34 Laird similarly argues that Renner’s death also 
unfairly prejudiced him, as Renner would have corroborated Laird’s 
version of events.35 Lastly, Laird argues the loss of body tissue 
evidence was unfairly prejudicial because Laird’s medical expert, 
Dr. Bennett, could not re-examine the samples to confirm his 
recollections that Kathryn’s bruising occurred post-mortem as a 
result of embalmment.36 
 
Laird next contends the State’s reasons for delay do not 
outweigh his prejudice. According to Laird, the State’s argument 
that it could not bring charges earlier because key evidence was not 
discovered and investigated until 2012 is not good cause for delay 
because the State possessed the note since 1999; Laird argues it was 
negligence, and maybe even reckless disregard, for a homicide 
investigation not to timely pursue all possible leads.37 Thus, Laird 
argues the prolonged prosecutorial delay substantially impaired his 
ability to mount an effective defense and the State’s reasons for 
delay do not outweigh these adverse results.38 
 
2. Appellee/Plaintiff State 
 
The State responds that the absent witnesses and lost 
evidence helped Laird’s defense, pointing to Laird’s use of Dr. 
Bennett’s testimony for an alternative explanation for Kathryn’s 
bruises as helpful and arguing that Dr. Mueller’s unavailability 
aided this testimony because he could not contradict Dr. Bennett.39 
Further, Dr. Mueller’s absence did not impede Laird’s ability to 
cross-examine witnesses present at the autopsy with Dr. Mueller.40  
 
The State also argues that Laird’s assessment of the benefit 
of Renner’s testimony to his defense is speculative. The parties 
dispute what statements Renner made to the FBI, and Laird did not 
                                                     
32 Id. at 23. 
33 Id. at 22–23. 
34 Id. at 23. 
35 Id. at 24. 
36 Id. at 26. 
37 Id. at 28. 
38 Id.   
39 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 30. 
40 Id. at 29. 
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provide Renner’s statements to the district court for review.41 
Further, the State was unable to cross-examine Renner about his 
relationship to Laird and possibly undermine the statements’ 
authenticity.42 The loss of body tissue samples, the State argues, also 
aided Laird because Dr. Bennett was able to present his recollection 
regarding the samples without fear of contradiction from the State.43 
 
Even if Laird could establish prejudice from the delay, the 
State argues that its reasons for delaying the prosecution weighed in 
favor of the State. Agent Jackson’s failure to follow up on the tip 
about Kathleen in 1999 was mere negligence on the State’s part, 





The question here is whether prejudice from delay only 
considers the loss of helpful evidence or whether it also 
contemplates impairment of the defense as prejudicial. Laird asserts 
that while he successfully demonstrated a loss of helpful evidence, 
the test for determining prejudice should not be limited to “helpful” 
evidence if the loss materially affects a defendant’s ability to 
confront the State’s case.45   
Framed this way, Laird’s argument about his inability to 
cross-examine Dr. Mueller might prove persuasive, considering the 
State’s use of Dr. Mueller’s statements in closing argument, where 
the State used the statement to suggest that after the doctor examined 
the bruises, Laird became the sole suspect.46 The Court may not need 
to consider Laird’s argument to find prejudice where the lost 
evidence is not necessarily helpful; the use of the statement in 
closing argument presents the Court with the question of whether 
the State impermissibly used it beyond the limited scope for which 
it was admitted. If so, the Court must consider whether the use of 
the statement and the impossibility of cross-examining Dr. Mueller 
deprived Laird of a fair trial. Given the State’s use of the statement 
in closing to directly blame Laird, it is likely the Court may find it 
to be materially harmful evidence and find Dr. Mueller’s absence 
prejudicial to Laird’s defense. Should the Court agree with Laird on 
this issue, there would be no need to proceed to the next two 
                                                     
41 Id. at 31. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 32–33. 
44 Id. at 34. 
45 Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 21.  
46 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 7, State v. Laird, https://perma.cc/PP5A-
B85B (Mont. Dec. 24, 2018) (No. DA 16-0473). 




B. Sufficient Evidence 
 
Due process requires the State to prove every element of a 
criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt.47 Here, the State had to 
prove Laird purposefully or knowingly caused Kathryn’s death.48  
 
1. Appellant/Defendant Brian Laird 
 
Laird argues the State failed to prove the causation element 
in Kathryn’s death beyond a reasonable doubt because it did not use 
a medical expert to establish the exact cause of Kathryn’s physical 
incapacitation.49 In support, Laird points to several Nevada cases 
establishing the State’s burden to affirmatively prove a criminal act 
caused the death and that circumstantial evidence showing only the 
possibility of such an act is insufficient.50 Laird argues against the 
State’s theory that Kathryn was incapacitated prior to drowning, 
stating this was not supported by affirmative proof that Laird 
incapacitated her. The State did not use a medical expert to testify 
to the cause of incapacitation, so Laird argues the State’s use of 
“suspicious” circumstances to point to his involvement was 
insufficient.51 Laird argues this circumstantial evidence amounted 
to mere speculation as to how Kathryn drowned.52 Laird further 
argues that while the bruising around Kathryn’s neck may be 
suspicious, the bruises alone were insufficient to prove a homicide 
without the medical opinion.53 
 
2. Appellee/Plaintiff State 
 
Countering Laird’s arguments, the State distinguishes the 
Nevada cases from the present action by pointing out that those 
cases involved victims who died from natural causes.54 The State 
argues that Kathryn’s death was not “natural,” leaving only 
accident, suicide, or a criminal act as the cause.55 To rule out suicide, 
                                                     
47 Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 29. 
48 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 34. 
49 Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 32. 
50 Id. at 34–35 (citing Frutiger v. State, 907 P.2d 158 (Nev. 1995); 
Hicks v. Sheriff, 464 P.2d 462, 465 (Nev. 1970); Azbill v. State, 440 P.2d 1014, 
1015–16 (Nev. 1968)). 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 35–36. 
53 Id. at 35. 
54 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 35. 
55 Id.  
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the State pointed to several pieces of evidence, including Laird and 
Kathryn’s arguments in the days before her death.56 Other evidence 
included Tanya’s testimony that Kathryn made plans with her the 
night she died, evidence of tearful conversations Kathryn had with 
family members before her death, and Kathleen’s testimony 
regarding what she heard the night Kathryn disappeared.57  
The State also argues that evidence of Laird’s behavior 
before discovering Kathryn’s body established guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The State contends that Laird’s apparent failure 
to make an effort to find Kathryn, taking Tanya to odd search 
locations, and insistence on cremating Kathryn’s body immediately 
despite her family members’ objections support the conclusion that 
Kathryn did not commit suicide nor die accidentally.58 The evidence 
also showed Kathryn was dragged to the water and did not fall into 
the bay.59 According to the State, this evidence dismissed any 
inference of suicide or accident and pointed to the conclusion that 




This issue considers what evidence sufficiently establishes 
causation in a homicide case when the cause of injury is in question. 
Neither party cites to a Montana case squarely answering the 
question for a criminal trial. Laird points to Estate of Willson v. 
Addison,61 which held that Montana requires a medical expert 
opinion on causation to avoid summary judgment in civil cases, and 
argues this requirement should extend to criminal cases.62 Laird 
concedes that a medical expert opinion is not required to prove 
causation when the cause of injury would be obvious to a layman.63 
The State attempts to argue that the circumstantial evidence 
resulting from the investigation sufficiently ruled out alternative 
causes of death, leaving criminal activity the only possible cause.64  
Should the Court agree with Laird that a medical expert is 
needed when the cause of death is in question, the State might face 
a more difficult task of proving causation in future homicide trials. 
However, it does not appear likely to change the result of this case 
                                                     
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 35–36. 
58 Id. at 35–38.  
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 39. 
61 258 P.3d 410 (Mont. 2011). 
62 Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 32–33. 
63 Id. at 33. 
64 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 39. 
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unless Laird successfully suppresses Dr. Mueller’s statements.  
The State conceded there was no evidence of physical head 
trauma or other injuries pointing to the cause of incapacitation,65 
making the bruising Dr. Mueller observed around Kathryn’s neck 
the sole source of suspicion. Dr. Mueller’s statement was presented 
to the jury in a limited capacity as evidence of a shift in the tone of 
the autopsy.66 Laird disputed this suspicion with Dr. Bennett’s 
testimony that the bruises occurred after Kathryn died.67 The State 
cross-examined Dr. Bennett to attempt to discredit his testimony, 
which must have persuaded the jury since it convicted Laird.68 
Therefore, unless Laird can suppress Dr. Mueller’s statement, the 
Court may find in favor of the State on this issue even if the Court 
agrees an expert opinion is required because the record shows Dr. 
Mueller’s statement was more persuasive than Dr. Bennett’s 
opinion. 
 
C. Testimony and Photo Evidence 
 
Testimonial statements made outside the courtroom and 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted are generally inadmissible 
unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.69 However, if the party 
admitting the statement can show the testimony is relevant to a 
theory other than the truth of the matter asserted, the statement may 
be admitted.70 Additionally, relevant evidence may still be excluded 
from trial if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
possibility of prejudicing the jury or creating confusion.71  
 
1. Defendant/Appellant Brian Laird 
 
Laird argues the district court’s decision to admit Dr. 
Mueller’s statement that he was “troubled” by the presence of 
bruises on Kathryn’s neck is reversible error because Dr. Mueller 
was not present at trial and Laird did not have a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine him.72 Laird further asserts that the statement is 
hearsay because the statement’s only possible relevance was to 
                                                     
65 Id. at 38. 
66 Id. at 39. 
67 Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 12. 
68 Id. at 14. 
69 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004); Mont. R. Evid. 
801(c); Mont. R. Evid. 802.  
70 Siebken v. Voderberg, 359 P.3d 1073 (Mont. 2015). 
71 Mont. R. Evid. 403. 
72 Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 37–38. 
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prove the truth of the matter: that Laird incapacitated Kathryn.73 
Laird cites two Florida court cases that held that when the only 
possible relevance of a statement is to the truth of the matter, the 
admitting party may not attempt to hide the reason for admittance in 
another theory.74 The testimony was supposedly admitted for the 
limited purpose of demonstrating how the autopsy process changed 
after the bruises were discovered.75 Laird argues this theory does not 
exempt the hearsay exclusion of the statement because the 
investigatory steps were irrelevant.76 He also argues the State’s 
subsequent use of the statement to convince the jury of Laird’s guilt 
shows that admitting the statement was not harmless error.77 
 
Laird further argues that the admitted photograph showing 
Kathryn’s skull with the skin peeled back was unduly prejudicial to 
the defense because it improperly inflamed the jury’s emotions and 
was not properly supported by any kind of foundation that the 
injuries depicted caused Kathryn’s incapacitation.78  
 
2. Plaintiff/Appellee State 
 
The State argues the district court properly admitted Dr. 
Mueller’s statement because it was offered to describe the 
statement’s impact on the investigation.79 This limited purpose did 
not admit the statement as hearsay because the State was only 
allowed to briefly mention what the doctor said—focusing on how 
the statement affected decisions, like a second autopsy—and it was 
not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.80 Further, even if the 
testimony was hearsay, its admission was harmless error because 
Agent Jackson was present at the autopsy and observed the same 
bruises about which Laird could cross-examine him. Dr. Bennett, 
Laird’s expert witness, also used Dr. Mueller’s statement to attempt 
to show Kathryn’s death resulted from suicide or accident.81 
 
The State counters Laird’s argument regarding the 
photograph with Montana precedent holding that instructive 
photographs are relevant and admissible as long they do not unduly 
                                                     
73 Id. at 38.  
74 Id. (citing Tosta v. State, 786 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001); Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263, 274 (Fla. 2000)).  
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 39. 
80 Id. at 40. 
81 Id. at 41. 
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prejudice the jury.82 The State argues that the photograph did not 
unduly prejudice the jury because the exact cause of Kathryn’s death 
was disputed, and the photograph was instructive to prove injuries 




Laird appears to ask the Court to narrow a party’s ability to 
admit hearsay evidence even if it is logically relevant to another 
theory. The Court may address this question directly and revisit its 
precedent for admittance of hearsay on another relevant theory, or 
the Court may choose to decide the issue on narrower Rule 403 
grounds. Should that happen, the most persuasive argument for 
Laird is the State’s subsequent use of Dr. Mueller’s statement in its 
closing argument as unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible hearsay.  
By directly referencing the statement as the turning point in 
the investigation and naming Laird as the only suspect resulting 
from that shift,84 Laird’s argument that the State exceeded the scope 
of the statement’s admittance is persuasive. Expressly connecting 
the statement to Laird as a suspect makes the statement more 
prejudicial than its intended use solely to explain the second 
autopsy. However, the hurdle for this argument is whether Laird will 
be able to prove the State’s subjective motivations at the time the 
statement was admitted. Regardless, the Court likely will find 
narrower Rule 403 grounds to determine the State impermissibly 




The questions analyzed here are just a few of the many 
considerations the Court will likely use to decide the case. 
Regardless of whether the Court reaches the second and third issue, 
the Court’s decision will provide guidance as to what constitutes 
actual, substantial prejudice in prosecutorial delays and what 
violates a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial. 
                                                     
82 Id. at 42 (citing State v. Dunfee, 114 P.3d 217 (Mont. 2005)). 
83 Id.  
84 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 46, at 7. 
